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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE M. BECK, 
Plaintiff and Appellam,t, 
-vs.-
DUT·CHlVIAN COALITION MINES 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8011 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANIT 
" 
STATEMENT OF CAS·E 
The plaintiff brought this action against the defend-
ant for legal and other services p·erformed by the plain-
tiff for the defendant during the period extending from 
August 19·21 to October 15, 1951 (R. 1). In its answer 
the defendant alleged that it has paid the plaintiff for 
the services rendered by him, except the sum of $1000.00 
and further alleges that plaintiff's claim is barred by the 
provisions of U.·C.A. 1953, 104-2-23. The action was tried 
with a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of 
$1'500.00 ·(R. 19-22). A motion for a new trial was made 
by the plaintiff, which was denied (R .. 45·-48). Plaintiff 
prosecutes an appeal to this Court from the judgment. 
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It is necessary for this court to review the evidence 
offered and received at the trial to pass upon some of 
the errors which appellant contends entitles him to a 
reversal of the judgment and the granting of a new trial. 
We shall, therefore, give a brief abstract of the evidence: 
Clarence M. Beck was called and testified on his 
own behalf as follows: (Note': The pages where the evi-
dence may be found are by the Court Reporter at the top 
of the page. The letter R refers to the judgment roll, the 
letters Tr to the transcript.) 
That he is and for 40 years last past, he has been a 
duly licensed and practicing attorney at law in Utah (Tr. 
1 to 3). ·That he was employed by the defendant corpora-
tion in August 1921 and has been its attorney continu-
ously since that time ( Tr. 5 to 6). That during all of tJ1e 
time since 19·21 the office of plain tiff was also the office 
of the defendant company; that at the time plaintiff 'vas 
employed, it was agreed that he would he liberally paid 
when there was money available with which to pay hin1 
and that he would be paid some money fro1n thne to ti1ne 
for expenses. 
That during the year 1921, the witness attended to 
routine correspondence and 1nade two or three trips to 
the mine to ascertain if the reports were true about there 
being some good ore uncovered in the mine (Tr. 10); 
that defendant con1pany was incorporated for one 1nillion 
shares of which Mr. Holden owned about 9/10 or 4/5 
(Tr. 11). That the witness prepared the by-la,vs of the 
company and they \Vere adopted in PithPr 1921 or 19~2 
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(Tr. 12-13). The by-la,vs of the co1npany were admitted 
in evidence, the san1e being on pages 7 to 15· of the 
n1inute book, Exhibit 3-7. Mr. Holden acted as general 
tnanager, treasurer and secretary, but the witness did 
not know he was formally appointe·d ('Tr. 16). It was 
admitted by counsel 'for defendant that Mr. Holden held 
the controlling interest in the defendant comp·any from 
the beginning and that he was the Inanaging dire'Ctor 
from and after 19~22; and that the plaintiff was employed 
as the attorney for the comp·any, including the prepara-
tion of minutes, by-laws, leases and the conducting of 
the litigation for the defendant company ('T·r. 19). 
Plaintiff further testified. that in 1921 after the 
defendant company was formed, Mr. Holden stated that 
it was necessary to have an office, an attorne-y and a 
director in Utah; that he wanted Mr. Beck to serve as 
attorney and that from time to time Mr. Beck would 
be paid-some money on account and for exp·enses; that 
he desired plaintiff to look after levying of assessments., 
securing lessors and the business generally because he, 
Holden (would be in Los Angeles (Tr. 21). That in 
l9'21 the witness assisted Ed· Senior in getting patent 
to the property by contacting the engineers and seeing 
that the mining property was prop.erly marked; that 
in 1921 he made 4 trips to the mine in American Fork 
Canyon; that Mr. Holden told the witness to keep him 
informed about the n1ine; that it i·s about 60 miles up 
to the mine which is in American Fork Canyon (Tr. 2·2) ; 
that Mr. Holden gave some stock to the witness, Ran-
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dolph, Haas, and Samuelson so they could serve as 
directors I(Tr. 2'3). 
The By-laws were prepared and adopted in 1922 and 
several letters were written concerning the assessment. 
That the witness prepared the assessment and the reso-
lution levying the same was passed (Tr. 26). Numerous 
of the 600 letters written were offered and received in 
evidence ( Tr. 28). After considerable negotiations, he 
prepared a lease in 1922 (Tr. 29). There were about 10 
consultations before the terms of the lease were agreed 
to. Mr. Holden was rarely in Utah and the business 
had to be done by telephone or by correspondence ( Tr. 
30). That the lessee, Mr. Wild, and his son operated 
the property under the lease in 1922 (Tr. 30). That the 
stockholders in the Old Dutchman were given shares 
in The Dutchman Coalition; that the witness brought 
in the Old Dutchman under an execution sale and forn1ed 
the Dutchman Coalition, defendant herein ( Tr. 33). 
That in 1922 the witness had considerable negotiations 
with Watson and others for the lease of defendant's 
property; provided they could n1ake a deal with Wild 
who held a lease (Tr. 34). There were a nwuber of 
resignations of officers in 1922; the witness kept and 
wrote up the minutes of the meetings (Tr. 34). That 
in 1922 the witnes.s made trips to the 1nine and con-
sulted with people who came into the office err. 38). 
That in 1923 stockholders list of delin4uents on 
assesstnent \vas worked over and \rork done to,varus 
securing patent and securing inforrnation requir~d by 
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Senior & Senior 'vho 'vere doing the legal work of 
securing· patent (Tr. 39). In 1923 negotiations were 
had with a ~Ir. Bourne about a lease, but no agreement 
'vas reached. That a ~Ir. Kersha\v had been acting as 
engineer for the mine, but he lost his commission and a 
new engineer was secured which made it necessary for 
the 'vitness to make several trips up to the mine to fix 
up the n1onuments and get copies of plats, etc. A Mr. 
A. W. Stowe- desired to lease the property and th~~ 
matter was taken up with Mr. Holden (Tr. 40). That 
Mr. Holden finally rejected the lease. Numerous addi-
tional letters of correspondence with Mr. Holden were 
offered and received in evidence (Tr. 41-42). 
That in 1924 the witness checked the proof of labor 
from July 1, 1923 to July 1, 19'24, there were five or 
six claims and a mill site (Tr. 43). That in 1924 there 
was a controversy with the two Wilds as to whose 
property the apex or some ore was on and the services 
of Clair Hogan was secured in connection with that 
controversy. That the witness negotiated and drew a 
lease with Heber Wild in 192·4 ('Tr. 45). That pursuant 
to the lease, Mr. Wild went into the possession of the 
property and opened up some valuable ore (Tr. 46). 
That in 1924, the witness made not less than 4 trips to 
the mine. That the witness had considerable corres-
pondence 'vith 11r. Holden about the operation of the 
mine in 1924 (Tr. 47). Numerous other letters to and 
fro1n ~lr. Holden in 1924 were offered and received in 
evidence and marked CC (Tr. 50). 
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In 1925 there was additional work done in clearing 
up the title to the defendant company's mine; that A. G. 
Knowlton completed his survey and his work was checked 
(Tr. 51). There were some missing records in the title 
and Mr. Kershaw had "flubbed up" the monu1nents (Tr. 
52). Mr. Kershaw had commenced the work when his 
commiS'sion was revoked and the work had to be done 
all over again. ·That a Mr. Charles Mercer wanted a 
lease on the mine dumps and he can1e to the office at 
least 5 or 6 times; that there were at least 10 or 15 
conferences about the lease and the witness was com-
pelled to go to the mine one night ('Tr. 54). That assays 
had to be 1nade of the material in the dumps; that it 
was the desire of Mr. Holden and the Board of Directors 
that the n1ine be continued to be active and to keep it 
active was part of the service of the witness. That 
considerable correspondence was had in 1925 (Tr. 55). 
Some of the correspondence had in 1925 was admitted 
in evidence and marked Exhibit DD (Tr. 56). 
That in 1926 a dispute arose about an assay of the 
dumps which made it necessary to make ·some extra 
trips to the mine; that the witness made not less than 
5 trips to the 1nine in 1926; that in making the trips to 
the mine, the witness -furnished his own conveyances 
(Tr. 61). Part of the correspondence had in 1926 con-
cerning the operation of the mine was received in evi-
dence and marked FF. That the proof of labor on the 
property was prepared and recorded by the witness 
in 1926 (Tr. 62). That the work done in 1927 was a 
repetition of what was done in 1926. That in 1927 not 
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less than three trips were Inade to the n1ine; that the 
witness prepared and filed proof of labor for 1927 ('Tr. 
63). That son1e of the correspondence with respect to 
operation of the defendant mine was received in evidence 
as Exhibit GG. 
That in 1928 it 'vas discovered that there was some 
of the record missing in the foreclosure of the property 
formerly owned by the Old Dutchman and now owned 
by the defendant. The Sheriff's Deed and Affidavit 
supporting it were lost and it required straightening out 
(Tr. 65). That in 1928 the \vitness made at least 12 
trips to Provo on that matter. That it was necessary 
to have a good title before a p·atent will issue; that in 
1928 Mr. Holden proposed to levy an assessment of 
lj20th of one cent per share on the stock of the defendant 
company and to make the assessment in California. That 
the witness made an investigation of the law as to 
whether a levy could be made on the· stock of the defend-
ant company by a Board of Directors meeting held in 
California and concluded that such a levy could not be 
validly made. That the witness spent fully a day and 
a half at the c·apitol Building looking up the law in that 
matter (Tr. 67). Part of the correspondence had by 
Mr. Beck affecting the operation of defendant's mine 
was marked HH and received in evidence (Tr. 68). 
That in 1929 the price of metals fell and the witness 
was unable to get anyone interested in the mine; that 
he made 3 or 4 trips to the mine during the year. 
That in 1930 Willard Cle·ghorn negotiated for a 
deal to lease the n1ine; that he talked to Mr. Cleghorn 
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several tin1es about making a lease ( Tr. 69). The "~it­
ness had some negotiations with some people about tak-
ing over the lease held by Heber Wild who was very 
discouraged. That during 1930 the witness attempted 
to get the Sheriff of Utah County to locate the nrissing 
papers in the foreclosure proceedings (Tr. 70). That 
during the year 1930 conference was had with Elias W. 
Gee, Marcellus Pope, the. district attorney, the county 
attorney and the District Judge in an attempt to get 
substitutions for the lost documents affecting the title 
to the property of defendant. Not less than 3 or 4 trips 
were made to the mine in 1930. That the five letters 
marked II were written in 1930 touching the operation 
of the mine of the defendant (Tr. 72). 
In 1931 very little was done 1n the 1natter of 
operating the mine. That in 1932 some protests were 
filed on the Wild Dutchman claim (Tr. 73). That because 
of the protest to the proceedings to secure patents, it 
became necessary to send Charlie Mercer up to the 
mine to make discoveries. It is necessary to have what 
is referred to as discoveries to secure patent~. You 
must also have a good title and proper 111arkings to get 
patent. That to see that this is done, the witness 1nade 
not less than 5 trips to the 1nine in 1932 (Tr. 7-!). J~art 
of the correspondence for 1932, consisting of six letters, 
was marked J J and received in evidence. 
That in 1933 the Mereer lea~e was rescinded ( 'rr. 
75). That Mr. Mercer wa~ gophering around on thP 
property in 1933 and the "' i tness 'vent n p to the property 
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to see 'vhat was being done. That part of the corres-
pondence had in 19'33 was received in evidence and 
marked KK (Tr. 76). That in 1934 Mr. A. W. Stowe 
'vas negotiating with the witness and others to secure a 
lease on the defendant's mine and other mining prop-
erties; that ~Ir. Holden was not satisfied with Mr. 
Stowe's offer (Tr. 77). That in 1935 Charlie Mercer was 
working the property; that in 1936 J. C. Jensen at 
Mercer's instance got interested in the Dutchman and 
ca1ne to the office of the witness not less than 25 times 
during 1935-1936 (Tr. 78) about leasing the mine of 
the defendant. That part of the correspondence had 
with respect to the mine of defendant is marked LL and 
was received in evidence. 
In 1937 further negotiations were had about con-
solidating the operation of the Dutchman and Mills 
Hill and Pacific claims; that to accomplish this it was 
necessary to get consent of the· Knight Investment Com-
pany of Provo which required 7 or 8 conferences at 
Provo (T·r. 79). That plan failed because a Mr. Norden 
and Wilhite were not willing to pay the money asked 
by the Knight property. That in 1937, not less than 
four trips were made to the mine; that Mr. Holden 
desired to hold a directors meeting in Los Angeles to 
levy an assessment of 1j10th of one cent on the stock 
of the company. The witness advised against doing so · · 
because upon investigation he found it doubtful if that 
could be done (Tr. 80). That a meeting of the Board of 
Directors was then called here in Salt Lake City. That 
at that meeting, resoultion,,vas passed to pay Mr. Holden 
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his back salary and an assessment of one cent per share 
on the stock of the· con1pany was proposed by Mr. Holden. 
That the witness prepared the necessary resolution and 
notices of the assessment and the minutes of the same 
( Tr. 81). That the witness was directed to buy all the 
stock upon which assessment was not paid; that a Mr. 
John Gottron, a prominent financier of Chicago and a 
stockholder of the defendant company carne to the meet-
ing of the stockholders and n1ade several threats (Tr. 
82). That a great amount of time was spent to keep 
Mr. Gottron from suing the compiany; that ~fr. Gottron 
said Holden did not know anything about operating a 
mine; that he was merely bleeding the mine and the 
witness was told by Mr. Holden to try to keep hin1 
quiet (Tr. 84). That the witness drew up the minutes 
for the assessment meetings, waiver of notice, oath of 
office. That Mr. Holden wanted a report of what was 
going on at the mine and respecting the stock and Mr. 
Gottron. That Mr. Holden sent the witness a certifi'cate 
for 10,000 shares; that there were negotiations had in 
1937 with Mr. Mercer and Alma Bourne respecting a 
lease on the property of the defendant. That during 
that year not less than 6 trips were made by the witness 
to the property, including the trips with ~lr. Gottron 
(Tr. 85). Part of the correspondence had touching the 
operation of the nune of the defendant was. received in 
evidence and marked MM. 
That in 1938 a I\ I r. Scowcroft of ()gden atte111pted to 
get a lease, but did not ( Tr. 86). rrhat in 1938 l\f r. Ahua 
Bourne was anxious to get a lease of the 1nine nnrl Mr. 
10 
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~lercer also desired a lease. That negotiations were had 
with ~Ir. Bourne and finally he got a lease-; that Mr. 
Gottron 'vas insisting that son1eone who knew something 
about Inining be secured to operate the property and 
~Ir. Holden suggested that the witne-ss secure the services 
of a mining engineer, and the witness talked to Harry 
Ruse about taking the job ('Tr. 87). That the witness 
spent considerable time 'vith Mr. Ruse and went to the 
mine with him, but the compensation he was to receive 
for his services was never agreed to by Mr. Holden. 
That in 1938 it was made- to appear that Alma Bourne 
did not want the lease for himself, but desired to sub-
lease the same (Tr. 88). That in 1938 the witness made 
not less than 6 trips to the mine-. Nine letters marked 
Exhibit NN were received in evidence as part of th~ 
correspondence had in 1938 touching the operation of 
the mine of defendant. 
In 1939, Willard Cleghorn became very much 
interested in the mine. As soon as the snow was off, 
he took the witness to the mine to se-e what was going 
on. He and Alma Bourne talked to the witness a great 
deal about the mine ('Tr. 89). Later in the S.p·ring or 
Summer, Willard (Cleghorn) took the witness up to the 
mine to se·e what was going on. Cleghorn and Bourne 
attempted to make a deal on operating the_ mine. The 
defendant company was intere-sted in keeping the mine-
operating (Tr. 90). That the witness told Mr. Bourne 
that his lease vvould be revoked unless he got someone 
on his lease with sufficient money to operate the mine. 
That during all this time there was no one in Utah 
11 
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except the witness upon whom process could be served 
(Tr. 91). The only person in Utah to take care of the 
business of the company was the witness. That in 1939 
Bert Scott complained about the operation of the 1nine 
and threatened to resign, but the witness prevailed upon 
him not to do so (Tr. 92). Part of the correspondence 
had in 1939 touching the business of the defendant is 
marked 00 and was received in evidence. That at least 
four trips were made to the mine in 1939. That in 1939, 
trouble developed ahout men being gassed in the mine of 
the defendant and considerable time was spent by the 
witness in ascertaining whether or not the defendant 
was liable for any injury that might be caused by the 
gas CTr. 93). 
That Mr. Bourne had assigned his lease of the 
property to a syndicate which was in charge of the 
property. That c·arbon dioxide gas formed in the urine 
in a moving fault; the gas was so heavy that it could 
be carried out in a bucket ; when poured on a candle 
it would put out the san1e; that in 1940 the witness did 
considerable briefing as to whether or not the defendant 
company was liable for any injury sustained by the 
men who were injured or killed with gas. The \vitness 
also took up with the people in charge of the 1nine the 
1natter of switching over to electricity and put in bigger 
blowers to re1nove the gas. That in 1940, the witness 
made about 8 trips to the mine. That the lease on the 
mine was assigned to the Golden West 1\tline and Leasing 
Co1npany and upon the direction A~Ir. IIoluen, the \\'it-
ness (Tr. 94:) went carefully into not only the question 
12 
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of the liability of the defendant company as to the gas, 
but also the subrogation of the lease to the Golden West 
Co1npany. That trouble was developed about the ground 
being drununy and the tilnber not being able to carry 
the weight. That the witness took up to the mine Paul 
Peterson to see "'"hat should and could be done to take 
care of the situation (Tr. 95). That it was discovered 
in 1940 that the title of the defendant was probably 
defective and a deed was pTepared and executed to the 
defendant company by Harvey Holden. ·That in 1940 the 
witness assisted the lessees of the defendant's mine to 
secure a better arrangement for the sale of the ore, 
if that could be done the defendant company would also 
get more from the sale of the ore (Tr. 96). The com-
pany got a royalty. Letters 1narked PP was received 
in evidence as p-art of the correspondence had in 19;40 
touching the busine·ss of the defendant company (Tr. 98). 
That the defendant company never paid the witness 
anything for the use of the office, but used it at all 
times. That in 1941 the comp·any consented to Alma 
Bourne assigning his lease to the Golden West and to 
assigning the lease to the U. S. S·melter as security for 
a loan. The witness attended to that business. That a 
resolution was passed upon motion of Mr. Holden that 
he be given a salary of $500.00 per month; that he be 
reimbursed $1700.00 for expense~; that he was elected 
Treasurer, General l\Ianager and that Marie Holden be 
elected secretary. The witness attended these meetings 
and drew up the minutes (Tr. 98). That negotiations 
were had for Mr. Cleghorn to take over th~ operations 
of the 1nine from the Golden West and for making a 
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deal with the American Smelting and Refining Co1npany 
to furnish its talent, equipment and money; that in an 
attempt to consumate an agreement, the witness made 
7 or 8 trips to Provo; that the matter was taken up 
with Mr. Booth and Mr. Gardner who were members 
of the Golden West; that later the An1erican Sn1elting 
& Refining Company (TT. 9·9) returned the data that 
had been turned over to it by the witness and said they 
could not accept the terms of the Golden West. That 
in 1941 the mine was operating and a number of people 
were interested ( Tr. 101). Part of the correspondence 
with respect to the operation of the defendant company 
was marked Exhibit QQ. Suit against Golden West was 
authorized in 1942 (Tr. 102). The suit was prosecuted 
until they agreed to take Mr. Cleghorn in with them. 
The suit was brought at Provo ('Tr. 103). Kelly and 
Gottron were threatening suit again ('Tr. 104). That 
conversations were had with Mr. Holden in 1939 to 46 
about the trouble with Kelly and Gottron (Tr. 105). That 
the witness was told to try to keep them quiet. In 1942 
the mine filled up with water and the witness investi-
gated the cause therefor ('Tr. 106). That the Business 
Regulations Commission wrote the witness letters and 
came to the office of the witness about fraudulent securi-
ties ('Tr. 107). That the witness has extensive negotia-
tions with Mr. Cleghorn about the use of his Pquipinf\nt 
to pu1np water and keep the gas out of the 1nine ( Tr. 
109). Sixteen letters marked RR were reet:)ived in evi-
dence as part of the t'orrespondenee had touching the 
business of defendant con1pan~· in 1942. 
14 
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In 1943 the annual stockholders meeting was held 
in the Felt Building on February 15th (Tr. 112). Con-
siderable friction developed between the company and 
the lessees and suit was commenced against the leasing 
company (Tr. 113). That there was considerable work 
on that suit. It was that suit which necessitated all of 
the trips to Provo (Tr. 116). That the witness attended 
to securing premiums on the B Bonus allowed by the 
R.F.C. Conferences were had with Mr. Gardner in order 
to get a loan of $50,000.00. There were 5 or 6 conferences 
about the matter; that a Herbert Fay, the R.egional 
Engineer of the R.F.C., was threatening to move: the 
equipment from the mine of defendant to Colorado (Tr. 
117). Exhibit S·S was received in evidence as part of 
the correspondence had in 1943 and Exhibit ·TT a.s addi-
tional correspondence had during that year as to the 
operation of the defendant mine (Tr. 119). 
In 1944 a stockholders' meeting was held and the 
salary of Mr. Holden was again fixed at $500.00 per 
month. That during that year the witness made several 
trips to Provo on business of the defendan~ company; 
that the witness had correspondence with Willard Cleg-
horn about the operation of the defendant's mine ('Tr. 
1'20). That in 1944 the witness held numerous confer-
ences with people interested in the operations of the 
defendant company (Tr. 121-24). That in 1944 the wit-
ness made not less than 2 or 3 trips to the mine; that 
during that year there were 10 or 15 conferences with 
J. C. Jensen in addition to the Combined Metals and 
Franklin Scherder corporation. Exhibit UU was received 
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in evidence as typical of the correspondence had in 19±4 
touching the business of defendant company. 
That in 19'45 the first three attempts to hold a stock-
holders' meeting failed because of there not being enough 
stockholders present (Tr. 215). That during the spring 
and summer of·1945 the witness spent fully 90 per cent 
of his time in an attempt to get the defendant mine going. 
Early in 1934, Mr. Crane and Mr. Fay of the R.F.C. 
took the position that there was an e1nergency and 
something had to be done; that the mine was not operat-
ing satisfactorily (Tr. 126). The R.F.C. had loaned the 
leasing company $30,000.00 and they wanted their money; 
there was plenty of ore, but it was not being mined out 
and the company could not get any money unless the 
ore was mined; that Cleghorn, Mayhew and Jensen were 
interested in leasing the property and it was necessary, 
and the witness was trying to find out who would rnake 
the best deal and was kept busy between Provo, Spanish 
Fork, Lehi and the Dooly Building (Tr. 127). That all 
who were interested in the leases had to participate in 
the negotiations with the R.F.C. to get the 1noney (Tr. 
128). That in 1945 a Mr. Gorman, field engineer for 
the R. F. C. and a Mr. Fail held a series of 1neetings 
with the lessors and the witness in connection with a 
complicated contract that was finally agreed upon. That 
contract was six weeks being negotiated (Tr. 129). 'rhat 
during the year there were not fewer than 20 1neetings 
held in the Booth apartn1ent house in Provo. That the 
witness had to negotiate all of the contracts ('rr. 130). 
That beginning about in February and eontinuing do"·n 
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to the sumn1er there were at least a rninin1un1 of 15 con-
ferences at Lehi or Salt Lake or A1nerican Fork with 
Charles illercer because he was acceptable, but he was 
trying to get cleared up at ~lercur; that Mercur was 
satisfactory to the R. F. C.; that Mr. Booth had put 
up most of the money and therefore it was necessary 
to get cleared with him and hence the numerous con-
ferences with him. That during the year 1945 the wit-
ness made three or four trips to the mine (Tr. 131). 
That all of the docwnents were carefully gone over by 
the witness. Exhibit VV was offered and received in 
evidence, the same being documents gone over by the 
witness and the same were negotiated by the witness. 
That Exhibit WW was received in evidence as a part 
of the correspondence had in connection with the opera-
,.. 
tion'of the mine. of defendant in 1945. 
That on May 15, 1946 a stockholders' meeting was 
held and a Board of Directors was elected. Mr. Stout 
refused to serve a~d was not re-elected (Tr. 133). That 
during the year 19'46 there were several conferencs with 
Herbert Fay and Willard Cleghorn and Combined Metals 
(Tr. 134). That in F'ebruary, 1946 there was a serious 
accident at the mine in which 3 or 4 men were gassed; 
that there was a question whether the defendant mining 
company was liable and whether they were fully covered 
with Workmen's Contpensation. There were several con-
ferences concerning that accident ( Tr. 135). In 1946 
considerable ore was being shipped from the mine and 
the \vitness spent considerable tin1e with Wilson !:fc-
Carthy and Bradford to secure a sp·ur on the Rio Grande, 
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but it did not get the haul. That Exhibit XX 'vas 
received in evidence as a part of the correspondence 
that was had in 1946 touching the business of the 
defendant company (Tr. 136-137). 
In 1947 there was the usual stockholders' and 
directors' 1neeting, the minutes of which were prepared 
by the witness (Tr. 138). The minutes of the 1neetings 
were received in evidence as Exhibit YY (Tr. 139-140). 
It appears from the minutes of the meeting that Mr. 
Gottron n1ade a trip from Chicago to attend the meeting. 
He stated that he was entirely dissatisfied with the way 
the 1nine was being operated and the salary paid to Mr. 
Holden of $4800.00 a year (Tr.140). The minutes further 
show that Mr. Holden stated that he had the responsi-
bility of operating the mine and it was proper that he 
be paid for his services (Tr. 141). That in 1947 after 
Mr. Gottron threatened to bring an action, Mr. Holden 
requested the witness to take care of Mr. Gottron and 
keep him quiet. ·That on two or three occasions prior 
to that time, Mr. Holden told the witness the same thing 
(Tr. 144-148). That the witness tried to get Cleghorn 
to buy the stock as requested by Mr. H-olden to get rid 
of Gottron ('Tr. 149). That the witness contacted Mr. 
Gottron by phone and upon three occasions talked to 
him in Chicago, once or twice in 1948 ; once in 1950 and 
once in 1951; that the witness urged Mr. Gottron to sell 
his stock and not bring a suit against the company (Tr. 
150-151). That ~vir. Gottron stated that if he could get 
Holden out of the n1ine, he Gottron eould raise a quarter 
of a Inillion dollars to develop the llline err. 152). That 
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in 1947 the witness secured the services of an engine-er 
to tnake a stratographer map ('Tr. 153). That during 
that year the witness had several conferences with Booth, 
Palfrey.rnan and Cannon, Exhibits ZZ were received in 
evidence as a part of the correspondence had in 1947 
in connection w·ith the operation of the defendant com-
pany ( Tr. 155). The check for $1000.00, dated March 
29, 1948 and the letter attached thereto was received in 
evidence as _._~AA (Tr. 156-157). The witness answered 
the letter. Exhibit BBB is the answer. It will be seen 
that in the letter the plaintiff was told that if he cashed 
the check it would be payment in full for his services up 
to that date ('Tr. 157) and in the answer Mr. Beck stated 
that he would accept $5500.00 if the same was p,aid 
promptly as payment for his services (Tr. 158). That 
the witness was given 10,000 shares so he could act as 
a director, but he does not know who was to get all 
of the 30,000 shares (Tr. 160-161). That the witness 
knew nothing about an alleged meeting of the Board of 
Directors of the defendant company where he was alleged 
to have been voted some stock (Tr. 161-162). That during 
the time the witness served as attorney for the defend-
ant company, he received a total of about $2'500.00; that 
not more than $350.00 went for expenses (Tr. 163). 
That the witness did not get more than $350.00 for his 
own use, the remainder was paid to other lawyers. That 
since 1945 or 1946 there has been no director, or officer 
or agent of the defendant company in Utah other than 
the witness ('Tr. 164). The Articles of Incorporation 
1nake Salt Lake City, Utah, the principal place of busi-
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ness of the defendant company (Tr. 165). That the suin 
of $100,000 was borrowed from the R. F. C. and expended 
in developing the property of defandant, all of which 
was paid back. There was about one-half million dollars 
worth of ore shipped from the mine while Cleghorn 
was operating the mine; that while Cleghorn and the 
Golden West were operating the 1nine, the witness 'vas 
informed that $800,000 worth of ore was shipped (Tr. 
166). That during all the time the witness testified to, 
the office of the eompany was mentioned in the office 
of the witness. That the money paid on assessments 
came to the office of the witness or was sent to ~1r. 
Holden (Tr. 167). That the lessees paid 15% royalty 
('Tr. 168). 
With the consent of the court and opposing counsel, 
Benjamin L. Rich and Herbert Van Dan1 were called 
as witnesses as to the matteT of their opinion as to what 
would be a reasonable attorney's fee to be allowed Mr. 
Beck. 
Mr. Benjamin L. Rich testified that he is and for 
49 years has been a lawyer practicing in Salt Lake 
City (Tr. 169). That he has had occasion to handle 
matters involving the operation of ntining properties; 
that he has been in Court and has heard the testhuony 
of ~ir. Beck; that assuming such testi1nony to be true, 
the reasonable value of the services during the \vhole 
period \Vould be between $12,000.00 and $15,000.00 ( '11 r. 
170). On cross-examination, ~I r. Rich gaYe his opinion 
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as to the value of the various parts of the service 
rendered by the plaintiff (Tr. 170-183). 
Herbert \Tan Darn testified that he is and for fifty 
years he has been engaged in the practice of law in Salt 
Lake City, Utah; that for nearly thirty years such 
practice has been aln1ost exclusively related to corpora-
tions and mining. That he has heard the testimony of 
Mr. Beck and has an opinion as to reasonable value of 
such service. That in his opinion the minimum value 
thereof is $12,000.00 (Tr. 183-4). On cross-examination, 
Mr. Van Dam testified as to the many companies he had 
represented and that he had discussed some of the, mat-
ters to which Mr. Beck testified (Tr. 184-187). 
The plaintiff was re-called and on cross-examination 
testified: That Mr. Holden was not a director for the~ 
first five years after the corporation was formed, but 
he directed the operation (Tr. 190-193); that the witness 
talked to 1\tfr. Holden about his employment at least 
75 times; that the witness was to be paid "when we 
get ready to pay the first dividend"; that no dividend 
has been paid ('Tr. 193). That the only promise of pay-
ment was that the witness would be handsomely paid. 
That the witness had asked for payment of this and 
that, such as for additional surveys (Tr. 194). That 
he asked for money to pay other people; that the plain-
tiff does not lmow what money, if any, the defendant 
cornpany has in the treasury (Tr. 195). That he does 
not recall when he asked for money (Tr. 196). That 
!fr. Holden said at the Stockholders' meeting that the 
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company was broke (Tr. 198). That the witness knew 
that ore was being shipped, but he did not know what 
was being paid the defendant company (Tr. 199). That 
a report was made, but the witness could not figure it 
out (Tr. 200). That in the fall of 1948, l\Ir. Gottron 
stated the co1npany had $32,000.00 in the bank, but he 
did not show the witness any paper to bear the staten1ent 
out. Exhibits 1 and 2, consisting of a nmnber of letters 
were received in evidence ( Tr. 204). Parts of these 
letters were read to the jury and dealt with the amount of 
money that was rec~ived by the lessees fron1 ore sold 
('Tr. 205-207). Plaintiff further testified that no formal 
final statements were made by him, but that he rendered 
statements between October 28, 1922, to June 16, 1944, 
for various amounts ranging in amounts of fro1n $25.00 
to $600.00. That the money so paid for the most part 
represented payments to engineers, geologists, costs 
and attorney's fees, other than himself (Tr. 211-21). 
Exhib1it 3 was reeeived in evidence and shows various 
items of trips to Provo by Mr. Holmgren and the wit-
ness and another in the sun1 of $375.00 as pay1nent in 
full for services in the case of Dutchlnan Coalition 
Mines Co. v. Alma Borne (Tr. 218). The other lawyers 
were employed in the litigation and the witness settled 
up with them (Tr. 220). Judge Dunford got $100.00. 
That the bills were for expenses, not for the time of 
the witness (Tr. 221). The witness was not present 
'vhen a resolution 'vas pa~sPd that 20,000 shares of stock 
was to be given hi1n for ~ervices during a period of 1 ~ 
year (Tr. 223). ''Phat the stock in the rlefPndant company 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had no value·. An assessment of 1 cent per share was 
levied against the stock. Some of the assessments of 
1 cent per share was paid (Tr. 227). 
The witness recalled that Mr. Holden requested the 
witness to present his bill either in 1946 or 1947 and 
the witness said he would prefer that he he not paid- --
until the next year (Tr. 237-38). That the: witness 
received a letter on August 6, 1947 in which Mr. Holden 
stated that it may be best to delay any further legal 
expenses until this matter (attorney's fees) is cleaned 
up. That the witness did not 'regard that letter as 
terminating his service-s (T·r. 240). That whe·ri the wit-
ness got the letter, Exhibit 7, which did not contain on 
the letterhead the name of the witness was the first 
time that he realized that something was haywire (Tt. 
241). ·That after the witness received the check for 
$1000.00 the witness did further correspondence for 
defendant company (Tr. 242). . That the· conferences 
the witness had with Mr. Gottron were in the interest 
of the defendant company and Mr. Gottron (Tr. 243). 
That the witness did not link together his claim with 
the threat of ~fr. Gottron to bring a law suit (Tr. 243a). 
On redirect examination, the witness testified that 
in many of the negotiations had, it would have been 
impossible to have secured any results unless he repre-
sented, not only the defendant company, but also the 
persons with whon1 the co1npany tried to do business. 
The interests of the parties involved in the various 
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to get any money they 1nade out of the ore that was 
mined. If the money had not been secured from the 
R. F. C. no mining could have been done (Tr. 266). 
That the settlement in the letter Exhibit 4 that the 
$375.00 and $2'25·.00 checks constituted payment in full 
referred to the payment made to Judge Stanley Dunford, 
Homer Holgren, docket fees and costs (Tr. 266-2G8). 
That any part of that money received by the witness 
was probably for telephone, gasoline and getting out 
liens; that he does not know definitely (Tr. 268) but 
the amount he received from those checks 'vas probably 
$25.00 or $50.00 (Tr. 269). 
Mr. Holden was called by the plaintiff and testified 
that he is here resisting the claim of the plaintiff. The 
witness was asked concerning the money had by the 
defendant company in 1946, but the Court indicated that 
it did not consider such evidence material and the plain-
tiff did not insist on pursuing that matter ( Tr. 271-272). 
Willard Cleghorn was called as a witness by the 
defendants and testified as follows : ·That he resides at 
American Fork, Utah; that he has been acquainted with 
the Dutchman n1ine since 1916 (Tr. 278). That from 
1945 to 1949, he was often in A1nerican Fork Canyon; 
that he saw ~Ir. Beck a few times at the Dutch1nan 
1nine (Tr. 279). That during the period of 1939 to 1942, 
Clarence Beck negotiated a loan through the R. E'. C. 
for the con1pany he was n1anaging. That the loan was 
for another company, but the Dutch1nan mine was dis-
cussed (Tr. 281). That Mr. Cleghorn finally took ovt·r 
a lease on the Dutclnnan 1nine (Tr. :2R2). Then he dis-
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cussed 1naking· a lease of the Dutchman with Mr. Holden 
and ~lr. Beck, but did not 1nake the changes in the lease 
that 'vas agreed upon after he contacted Mr. Holden. 
F·rank Johnson drew up a satisfactory contract and the 
sa1ne was executed (Tr. 183-184). That there was paid 
to the witness during 1'946 to 1949 both dates included, 
a total of $-!44,758.58 which included all go:vernment 
subsidies (Tr. 284). The total amount paid to the 
Dutchman in royalties was $41,851.52 (Tr. 285). That 
he never gave Mr. Beck a statement of the royalties 
paid. That the witness does not recall going up to the 
mine with Mr. Beck (Tr. 286). 
Alma Bourne, a witness called by defendant testified 
m substance as follows: That he now resides at Salt 
Lake City, but has resided most of his life in American 
Fork (Tr. 294). That ~e has been acquainted with 
operations in American Fork Canyon for 30 or 40 years 
(Tr. 295). That he got a lease on the mine in 19·30; 
that he and Mr. Murphy operated the 1nine in 1938-39 
and that ~Ir. Cleghorn took it over in 1944 or 1945 (Tr. 
296). That he has been employed by Mr. Holden to look 
after the mine from 19!49 on; that he has known Mr. 
Beck all his life ; that he has seen Mr. Beck one time 
at the mine on a picni'c; that he has not talked with Mr. 
Beck at the mine but only on the streets in Salt Lake; 
that he has not discussed the mine in Mr. Beck's office 
(Tr. 298). That he lived at the 1nine part of the time, 
but did not manage the operations (T·r. 299). That 
fron1 1941 to 1943 royalties were paid to the defendant 
company (Tr. 300). The a1nount was between $7000.00 
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and $8000.00; that the witness and not l\lr. Beck 
employed Mr. Heist (Tr. 301). Mr. Bourne testified 
that he had never been in Mr. Beck's office (Tr. 298) 
but later he said he was in his office one time ( Tr. 312). 
Mr. Holden was called as a witness by the defendant 
and in part testified : That he had been managing 
director of the defendant mine since about 1930 and 
has held a controlling interest before that time ( Tr. 313). 
That in July 21, 1922 the witness paid Mr. Beck $194.00 
for incorporating the ·company and preparing the By-
Laws (Tr. 315). That the witness did not employ Mr. 
Beck, but he knew Mr. Beck was serving the company 
(Tr. 316). That the witness told Mr. Beck that he would 
pay him as they went along. He did not say he would 
pay him handsomely (Tr. 317). Then he asked Mr. 
Beck for his bill in 1946 and asked him before and 
since (Tr. 317). That he asked him around 1940 and 
19'41; that he has no idea about the size of the bill; that 
Mr. Beck drew the n1inutes of the co1npany and the 
lease to Mr. Bourne and that was all, no, he also drew 
the assignment of the lease to the Golden West (Tr. 318). 
That in 1946 he told Mr. Beck to send in his bill and 
that the directors would not stand for any great bill 
and Mr. Beck said he had had a good year and his 
income tax would be large and to let it go until next 
year and Mr. Beck further stated he would not send 
in his bill until he first talked to Mr. Jfolden (Tr. 319); 
that in 1947 ~Ir. Beck told the witness that he could 
give hin1 $2000.00 on account (Tr. 320); that the witnP~~ 
told Mr. Beck that he would not pay $2000.00 until he 
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knew 'vhat he 'vas paying for; that he told Mr. BeeR', 
not to do any n1ore legal 'vork on the mine until the bilr 
'vas settled and then he went out of the office ; that the 
witness and ~ir. Holden were in Salt Lake in the fall 
of 1947 and saw Mr. Beck in the Hotel Utah when he 
told Mr. Beck that when he last saw him he toJd Mr. 
Beck not to do any more work with the mine until the 
bill is settled; that Mr. Beck said: ''You can't live in 
Los Angeles." I said: "(Tr. 321) I do not want any 
more to do with you until. your bill is settled." He said 
"you will get your bill" and he turned and went and 
that is the last time he saw the witness. Tha.t he wrote 
Mr. Beck in January, 1948 saying he would he at the 
stockholders meeting. That the witness did not know 
that Mr. Beck was performing service for the company 
(Tr. 322). That the witness thought Mr. Beck was to 
get the patent and did not know until later that Senior 
was to do the work ('Tr. 323). That Mr. Beck disappeared 
for several years, but he finally located him at Long 
Beach. That Mr. Beck originally received 10,000 shares 
for which no service was rendered (Tr. 32'4). They were 
given to him; that the witness gave Mr. Beck 20,000 
shares for preparing the assessmen~; that the directors 
meeting when the stock was voted was held in Los 
Angeles; that Mr. Beck was not there; that the witness 
did not know whether or not notice was given of the 
meeting (Tr. 325 ). That the witness prepared the 
rninutes; that the second meeting was held to pay Mr. 
Beck; that he does not know "\Vhy the second meeting 
\Vas in part a duplication of the first; that Mr. Beck 
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saw a copy of the 1ninutes (Tr. 326); that the witness 
mailed a copy of the minutes to ~Ir. Beck and gave him 
the 20,000 shares of stock; that he does not know 'vhether 
or not he mailed the stock; that the stock book was kept 
in Los Angeles; that Mr. Beck has had the minute 
book in his possession since 1937 ( Tr. 327) ; that all of 
the minutes of meetings held prior to 1\Iay 1938 were 
in the minute book when the book was given to Mr. 
Beck (Tr. 330); that the witness does not remen1ber of 
discussing the 20,000 shares of stock with Mr. Beck 
(Tr. 331). The company had at the time of the trial 
$13,939.52. Exhibit 4, an audit of the business was 
received in evidence ( Tr. 337) ; a copy of that exhibit 
was given to Mr. Beck. ·The stock in the new company 
was sold back to the old stockholders at 14 of a cent a 
share ('Tr. 337). A bank book showing the deposits of 
the defendant was received in evidence as Exhibit 16 
( Tr. 338). That the witness met Mr. Gottron at a stock-
holders meeting in 1947 when he objected to the salary 
paid Mr. Holden and also stated that he, l\lr. Gottron, 
desired to be made a director; that Mr. Gottron did 
not threaten a law suit or shake his fist in the witness' 
face ( Tr. 340) ; that after Mr. Gottron left the meeting 
in 194 7, Mr. Beck told the witness that he, the witness, 
was in the right and that 1\lr. Gottron was a bluff (Tr. 
341). That the witness did not employ l\1 r. Beck to 
appease Mr. Gottron ('Tr. 341). That the witness 
referred l\lr. G-ottron to l\lr. Beek, hut he did not tell 
~Ir. Beck to write to G·ottron; that the witness did not 
authorize l\lr. Beck to do anything for the con1pany 
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about Mr. Gottron (Tr. 344). On cross-examination the 
witness testified that Mr. Beck was fired as the attorney 
for the company; that he is still a director and that the 
office of the company has not been changed (Tr. 34:5). 
That the Dutchman does its business in Los Angeles 
at the home of the witness, but he has never secured a 
franchise to do business in Los Angeles (Tr. 346). That 
the witness thinks i\Ir. Beck should he paid for the · 
numerous letters written by him; that Mr. Beck was the 
legal adviser of the company and he has nothing to do 
with its business (Tr. 348). ·That anyt4ing Mr. Beck 
knew of interest to the con1pany the witness exp·ected 
Mr. Beck to advise the witness but that was not legal 
stuff; that Mr. Beck should not be paid for that, his 
stock should pay for that (Tr. 349). The witness does 
not think Mr. Book should be p·aid for anything e:x:ce~pt 
legal services (T·r. 351). That on July 31, 1946 the 
witness wrote a letter to Mr. Gottron in which he stated 
that "you will confine your future correspondence to 
our attorney, C. R,. Beck .... " (Tr. 365). That the wit-
ness does not recall of having revoked that direction 
(Tr. 368). That the witness does not know whether Mr. 
Beck had notice of the meeting when it was recited by 
the minutes that he, Mr. Beck, should receive 20,000 
shares of stock (Tr. 372). That the witness is drawing 
$50.00 a month fro~ the defendant mine for trying to 
get someone interested in it (Tr. 386). A number of 
letters written by ~fr. Gottron to Mr. Holden, marked 
Exhibit #8, were ad1nitted in evidence over the objection 
that the sa1ne were incompetent and heresay as to the 
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plaintiff. The letters were received in evidence (Tr. 388). 
The letters consist of correspondence about the operation 
of the mine. There was also admitted in evidence, over 
plaintiff's objections, correspondence between Mr. Beck 
and Gottron concerning the defendant company and the 
manner in which it was being opera ted ( Tr. 4:04-411). 
On rebuttal Mr. Beck testified that he saw l\Ir. Holden 
in the Coffee Shop of the Hotel Utah in the fall of 1947 
but that notwithstanding Mr. Beck spoke to ~Ir. Holden 
the latter said nothing (Tr. 412). 
The foregoing abstract of the evidence, while 
somewhat sketchy, will serve to direct the attention of 
the court to the extent and nature of the work done 
and the correspondence had by the plaintiff with Mr. 
Holden, the :r:nanager and chief stockholder of the defend-
ant company during the ntore than 30 years that the 
plaintiff rendered services for the defendant con1pany. 
A cursory examination of the nurnerous letters that 
were written to and by the plaintiff touching the business 
of the defendant co1npany furnish conelu~ive cor-
roboration that the services rendered by the plaintiff 
were very extensive and that contrary to the testi1nony 
of Mr. Holden that Mr. Beck disappeared for several 
years (Tr. 3'24), the constant strean1 of letters between 
1\tfr. Beck and Mr. Holden (only a part of which were 
offered in evidence) conclusively shows that l\Ir. Beck 
was on the job substantially all the tirne during 1nore 
than thirty years attending to the business of the defend-
ant con1pany and keeping the absent general 1nanag-er of 
such company infor1ned concerning its operation. 
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At the conclusion of the evidence the jury brought 
in a special verdict for the total sum of $1500.00 for 
which amount the court below awarded judgment (R. 43). 
A motion for a new trial was made by the plaintiff and 
by the court denied (R. 48). This app·eal is p~rosecuted 
by the plaintiff. 
In the light of these facts it is appellant's contention 
that the following prejudicial errors were committe:d 
by the trial court which require a reve~rsal of the judg-
ment appealed from and the granting of a new trial 
to the appellant. 
STATEMENT. OF POINTS RELIED UPON F'O·R 
A REVERS.AL OF THE JUD·GMENT 
P·OINT ONE· 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE BURDEN WAS ON THE 
DEFENDANT TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN PAID TO 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR HIS SERVICES AS REQUESTED IN 
PARAGRAPH TWO OF HIS REQUESTS (R. 23-24). 
POINIT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY THE PROPOSITION CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION 
2 ·FOR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW T'HE 
CLAIM SUED UPON IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE -
OF LIMITATIONS (R. 25 and Tr. 492). 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS TO ANSWER ITEM b OF GROUP 3 IN 
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THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT 
THERE WAS A RUNNING ACCOUNT AND EACH ITEM 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY (R. 20 
and Tr. 493). 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUESTING THE 
JURY TO ANSWER QUESTION 2 OF GROUP 5 IN THAT 
IF MR. HOLDEN WAS PAID WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS 
OWING TO HIM THERE WOULD BE NO MONEY TO PAY 
PLAINTIFF (Tr. 493 and R. 21). 
POINT FTVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL (R. 45 and 48). 
ARGUMENT 
P·OINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE BURDEN WAS ON THE 
DEFENDANT TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN PAID TO 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR HIS SERVICES AS REQUESTED IN 
PARAGRAPH TWO OF HIS REQUESTS (R. 23-24). 
The plaintiff requested the jury to answer the 
following question: 
2. We find by the preponderance or greater weight 
of the evidence that the plaintiff has been paid for such 
services, the sum of $ ................ ( R. 23). 
The trial court refused such request (R. 24). On 
the contrary, the court in it~ inHtructions required the 
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plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
the amount that remained unpaid for his services which 
in effect required the plaintiff to prove by a pre-ponder-
ance of the evidence that the amount claimed to have 
been paid by the defendant was in fact not paid (R. 2'5). 
Apparently the plaintiff failed to take an exception to 
the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction. 
Such fact, however, does not preclude this court from 
passing upon the error of the trial court in failing to 
give the requested instruction or some other instruction 
of similar import. Rule 51 of Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides in part that notwithstanding the failure 
to object to the giving or refusing an instruction "the 
appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving or failure to give· an 
instruction." Independent of this rule, this Court has 
held that a new trial may be granted for an error which 
is manifestly prejudicial to the party aggrieved. State 
v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89; 60 Pac. (2d) 952; State v. Smith, 
90 Utah 482; 62 Pac ( 2d) 1110. This court and the courts 
generally have uniformly held that the burden of proof 
is on the one claiming payment to establish the same 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 Am. Jur. 152, 
Sec. 148 and cases cited in foot note 2; 40 Am. Jur. S·ee. 
278, page 893-4 and numerous cases there cited in foot 
notes; 70 C.J.S. page 298; Marks v. Marks 100 Pac. (2d) 
207; 98 Utah 400; Bell v. Jones 100 Utah 87, 110 Pac. 
327; State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead 82 
Utah 416; 25 Pac (2d) 612. 
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That it is prejudicial error to place the burden of 
proof on the wrong party has frequently been held by 
this court : Hillyard v. B air, 4 7 Utah 549 ; 155 Pac. 449 ; 
Whipple v. Preece et al, 18 Utah 454; Dimnick v. Utah 
Fuel Company, 49 Utah 430; 164 Pac. 872; In re Hanson,.s 
Will, 50 Utah 206; 167 Pac. 256. 
One of the issues raised in this case was what part 
of the services rendered by the plaintiff were paid for. 
As illustrative of such issue was the evidence touching 
the 20,000 shares of stock in the defendant company 
that was delivered to the plai~tiff. It was made to 
appear that an alleged 1neeting of the board of directors 
of the defendant company was held in c·alifornia, but 
so far as appears no notice was given of any such meeting 
to the board of directors who did not attend that meet-
ing (Tr. 324-326); that the purpose of giving Mr. Beck 
the 20,000 ~hares of stock was not discussed with l\lr. 
Beck. The foregoing is the testimony of Mr. Holden. 
Mr. Beck testified that he knew nothing about who was 
to get the 20,000 shares, but 10,000 were given to hiln 
so he could serve as a director and he knew nothing 
about the directors' Ineeting held in California when 
the stock was directed to be paid to hin1 for services 
(Tr. 160-'162). There is other evidence touching the 
n1oney received by Mr. Beck and for what purpose it 
was used (Tr. 163-165). In light of the fact that plain-
tiff requested the court to instruct the jury that the 
burden vvas on the defendant to establish the a1nount 
that \Va~ paid for the ~ervices rendered by tltP plaintiff 
for the defendant, and the fa<'t that the authoritiPs are 
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all to the effect that such is the law and the further fact 
that the verdict in this case is so meager when considered 
in connection \vith the extensive services rendered by 
the plain tiff, as we shall hereafter discuss in detail, 
it would seen1 that this is a case where the discretion of 
this court should be exercised to the end that a ne·w 
trial should be granted on the error of the lower court's 
failure to instruct as to the burden of proof even if 
an other error was committed. 
In the lower court counsel for the defendant con-
tended that because some of the services rendered by 
Mr. Beck had been performed so long ago there is a 
presumption that the same had been p·aid. This court 
has upon at least two occasions held that where there 
is evidence touching a fact in controversy, any pre-
sumptions that might otherwise exist disappear from 
the case. State v. Green 78 Utah 58, 6 P. (2d) 177; In 
reNewell'sEstate78Utah463,5P. (d) 230. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY THE PROPOSITION CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION 
2 FOR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 
CLAIM SUED UPON IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS (R. 25 and Tr. 492). 
It will be noted that counsel for the plaintiff objected 
to the giving of instruction No. 2 which is labeled as 
2a, 2b and 2c for the following reasons: 
1. That the plaintiff has not made demand for the 
paYJnent of the money claimed by him, and until such 
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demand is made, no cause of action exists in his favor. 
2. Because the evidence shows that the plaintiff 
could not have secured personal service of summons 
upon this defendant company during the last several 
years of the co1npany's doing business within the state 
of Utah, or at any time as much as 4 years prior to 
the commencement of this action. 
3. That the evidence shows without conflict and 
as a matter of law that the defendant company acknowl-
edged the existence of this obligation within four years 
of the date of the comn1encemen t of this action. 
4. That the evidence shows without conflict that 
the office of the company was maintained at the office 
of Clarence Beck in Salt Lake City, Utah, and that the 
evidence further shows that the defendant co1npany by 
its director admitted that so1nething should be paid for 
such service and also the evidence shows that plaintiff 
has been performing services for the co1npany in con-
nection with Mr. Gottron, etc. (Tr. 492-493). 
At the outset we digress to observe that in the main 
the jury found such facts as precluded the defendant 
from availing itself of the bar of the statute of lilnita-
tions and the court awarded plaintiff judgment for the 
various a1i1ounts found by the jury. In such case it 1nay 
be contended that the errors in the instructions touching 
the statute of limitations were not prejudicial. It is the 
unifor1u holding of this and other courts that it is error 
for the court to instruct the jury on 1na tters that art) 
not in issue, or if n1ade an issue by the p]earlings adrnit 
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of but one finding under the evidence. In the case of 
Jensen v. Utah Railw·ay Co. 72 Utah 366; 2'70 Pac. 349, 
in reversing and re1nanding for a new trial a verdict 
in the lower court had this to say: 
H'Thus the charge falls within the familiar 
rule that it is error to give instructions based on 
a state of facts which there is no evidence tending 
to prove or which the undisputed evidence in the 
case shows did not exist even though such instruc-
tions contained correct statements of law." 
Among the other Utah cases which are to the same 
effect is the case of Tyng v. Investment Co. 3'7 Utah 304, 
108 Pac. 1109; State Bank of Beaver Cownty v. Hdllings-
head 82 Utah 416; 25 Pac. (2d) 612. The authorities 
are not agreed as to whether or not it is reversable error 
to give instructions outside of the issues. Some of the 
cases so hold, others take the view that the question of 
whether or not such instructions constitute reversable 
error depends upon the question of prejudice to the 
complaining party. 3 Am. Jur., 630 and the cases there 
cited in foot note. 
In this case the instructions are so involved that 
a Philadelphia lawyer may well have difficulty in grasp-
ing their full import. That the jury was confused by 
the instructions is made apparent by their returning into 
court and requested the court to explain the Statute of 
Limitations (Tr. 494). The trial court orally attempted 
to explain to the jury in a general way the purpose of 
the statute of lilnitations, but we apprehend that such 
explanation tended but to divert the attention of and 
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confuse the jury as to the real issues in this case, namely, 
what was the reasonable value of plaintiff's services 
during the more than thirty years he served the defend-
ant and what amount had the defendant paid the plain-
tiff therefor. We confess it is difficult to point out with 
any degree of certainty as to just what effect the 
numerous and involved instruction on the statute of 
limitations had on the minds of the jury, but certain it 
is that such instructions were calculated to cast doubt 
on the validity of plaintiff's claims and as such probably 
influenced the jury to- award the plaintiff only a part 
of the compensation that he was entitled to receive if 
his claim had been freed from such intimation of inva-
lidity. It is quite probable that the jury reduced the 
amount to which plaintiff was entitled to receive at 
their hands because the court, by its instructions on 
the statutes of limitations, had indicated that plaintiff 
might be at fault in bringing his action. 
It is because of our view that the instructions on 
the statute of limitations was prejudicial to plaintiff',s 
claim for compensation for services performed that we 
have deemed it proper to discuss that subject in this 
our opening brief rather than wait for respondent's 
brief and then discuss that subject 1natter in a reply 
brief. 
It is first contended that the statute of limitations 
did not begin to run until Mr. Beck 1nade demand for 
payn1ent. In the case of Wilson v. Weber Oo'U/YI,ty 100 
Utah 141, 111 Pac. (2d) 147, at page 150 of the Pacific 
R.eporter, it is said; 
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HThe test is whether the performance of the 
condition (the demand or notice) is a part of the 
cause of action or n1erely a step in the remedy. 
If the latter, the statute does not start to run 
upon the demand or notice, if the former, it starts 
to run upon that demand or notice." 
In that case the court cites 37 C.J.S. 955, Sec. 326, 
and cases in note 53 where it is said: 
"Where, although the cause of action itself 
has accrued, some preliminary step is required 
before resort can be had to the remedy, the con-
dition referring merely to the remedy and not to 
the right, the cause will be barred if not brought 
within the statutory period; therefore the pre-
liminary step must be taken within that period." 
To the same effect is 54 C.J.·S .. , page 212, S-ec. 201-2. 
Again on page 966, Sec. 344, it is said: 
"Notwithstanding the general rules requiring 
a demand to· be made within a reasonable time 
o~. within the period of limitations, the parties 
may make a demand a condition p·recedent, and if 
it appears -that the money or claim_ which is the 
subject of the contract is to be paid on demand 
in fact, the statute will not begin to run until 
an actual demand has been made. And where the 
instrument itself indicates that the calls for pay-
ment are to be indefinitely prospective, and are 
to be made as might suit the wants or convellience 
of the payee, or where a speedier demand would 
obviously violate the intention of the parties as 
indicated by the terms of their contract, there 
is no ground furnished upon which the law can 
assume any fixed point as the limit to the reason-
able time for making demand .. Where it appears 
that the parties contemplated a delay in making 
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the demand to so1ne indefinite time in the future, 
the statutory period for bringing the action is 
not controlling as to the question of reasonable 
time."-37 C.J.S. 966, Sec. 344, and 54 C. J. S., 
page 213, Sec. 201-3. 
See also the case of Aitken v. Hayward, 156 Pac. 
(2d) 59 and cases and authorities there cited. 
In this case Mr. Holden was the only person who 
knew the amount of money that the defendant company 
had or the amount or nature of its outstanding obliga-
tions. It was clearly the duty of Mr. Holden to keep the 
officers of the defendant corporation advised as to its 
financial condition. That being so, neither he nor the 
defendant corporation could be heard to make the clailn 
that the statute of limitations run against plaintiff's 
claims in the absence of a slio:wing that he had knowledge 
of such facts. The fact that plaintiff was asked to 
present a claim for his services fall far short of infornl-
ing the plaintiff as to whether or not there was suffi-
cient 1noney in the hands of the corporation to pay its 
obligations, including that of the plaintiff. Indeed 
whether there was or was not sufficient funds to pay 
his claim would depend upon the amount of his clain1, 
and as is held in the case of Aitken v. Hayward, supra 
and the cases and authorities there cited, a dentand is 
necessary before a cause of action arises where such 
is within the conte1nplation of the parties. In this case, 
the defendant, by the tender of the $1000.00 chGek and 
refusal to pay more started the running of the ~tatute 
of li1nitations and therehy \\~aived an~~ de1nand on behalf 
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of the plaintiff. This action was brought within the 
statutory period after that tender, the same being March 
29, 1948. 
The second basis for plaintiff's claim that the statute 
of limitations were not available as a defense to the 
action is that the evidence shows without conflict that . 
personal service of swmnons could not have been had on 
the defendant after 1946 because there was no person 
in Utah other than the plaintiff upon whom service 
could be had except upon Mr. Holden who was in Utah 
only for a day or two about once a year (Tr. 91-2 and 
133). 
Prior to taking effect of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on January 1, 1950 the law dealing with the 
service of summons on a corporation provided: 
U.C.A., 1943, 104-5-11, subdivision 5: 
"The summons must· be served by delivering 
a copy thereof. If the defendant is a dome-stic 
corporation, to the president or head of the 
corporation, secretary, treasurer, cashier or man-
aging agent thereof. If no such p·erson can be 
found within the state, then upon a director of 
the corporation found within the state." 
That section then provides for the person upon whom 
summons may be served upon a foreign corporation, but 
as the defendant herein is a domestic corporation, such 
provisions have no application here. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
becarne effective on January 1, 1950, Rule 4, Sub-
division 4 thereof, page 4 provides: 
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"Services of swnmons may be had upon any 
corporation, not herein otherwise provided for 
upon a partnership or other unincorporated asso-
ciation which is subject to suit under a comn1on 
name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, 
a managing or general agent, or to any other 
agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process and if the agent is one 
authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant. If no such officer or agent can be 
found in the county in which the action is brought, 
then upon any such officer or agent having the 
1nanagement, direction or control of any property 
of such corporation, partnership, or other unin-
corporated association within the state. If no 
such officer or agent can be found in the state 
and the defendant has, or advertises or holds 
itself out as having an office or place of business 
in this state, or does business in this state, then 
upon the person doing such business or in charge 
of such office or place of business." 
It will be seen that by ·the adoption of the 11 tah 
Rules of Civil Procedure service of smnmons n1ay be had 
upon a domestic corporation by service upon persons 
otJ:ler than those that may have been served prior to the 
adoption and the taking effect of such rules. However, 
such fact need not concern us in this proceeding, because 
there was only slightly more than two years elapsed be-
tween the time the Rules of Civil Procedure took effect 
and the time this action \vas conunenced. The I~ules of 
Civil Procedure did not have any retroaetivt• effec-t and 
therefore if under the provisions of our la\\· as to 'vhou1 
1nay be served with su1n1nons in an aetion brought 
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against a do1nestic corporation becon1es of controlling 
importance as to whether the statute of limitations is 
available to the defendant herein, that is to say the stat-
ute of limitations not having run since the Rules of Civil 
Procedure was adopted, no service of summons could 
be had upon the defendant before that time exce,pt upon 
the officers designated in the 'Statute. 
The law seems to be well settled and so far as we can 
find the cases are in accord with the doctrine thus stated 
in 42 Am. Jur. Sec. 108, beginning on page 93, which we 
quote at length._ 
"A corporation, being an artificial entity, 
cannot be personally served with process, and can 
be served only through an officer or agent of the 
company, or someone designated by law to receive 
service of process in its behalf. At common law, 
service was made on such head officer of a corpo-
ration as secured knowledge of the process to the 
corporation, but the practice statutes and rules of 
practice of the several jurisdictions now regulate 
this matter, and the general form of such statute 
is to require service on some particular officer of 
the corporation. It is clearly within the power of 
the state to determine vvho such officer or agent 
shall be and how he shall be designated by the 
corporation, provided always that the constitu-
tional guaranties of due process of law are ob-
served. The discussion and analysis of statutes 
governing service of process upon a foreign cor-
poration doing business within the state, and the 
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classes of officers and agents upon whom service 
of process 1nay be made within those statutes, "rill 
doubtless pro:ve very helpful in the determina-
tion of the meaning and of the construction and 
interpretation of provisions regulating service of 
process upon domestic corporations. 
"When the officer or agent upon who1n serY-
ice of process in an action against a corporation 
may be made is specified in the statute or rule of 
practice, service must be 1nade upon that identical 
officer or agent; otherwise the service is insuffi-
cient. 
"Even though a person is within the tern1s 
of a statute, if his relation to the plaintiff or the 
claim in suit is such as to Inake it to his interest 
to suppress the fact of service, such service is 
unauthorized. Therefore, an officer or agent of 
a corporation cannot comn1ence an action against 
such corporation by serving hi1nself with process." 
It would indeed be a strange doctrine and fraught 
with endless possibilities of fraud to per1nit an officer 
to secure a judgment in personam against a corporation 
by the service of summons upon hhnself. In our seareh 
we have been unable to find any authority under a stat-
ute such as ours which gives color to such a doctrine. 
Indeed, if a statute were to be given such construction, 
it would seem that the sa1ne 1nust be held unconstitutional 
in that it would offend against the provision of state 
and federal constitutions whieh accord to everyone whose 
rights are to be affected, due process of lu,v. 
The attention of the court is again directed to pro-
visions of lT.C.A. 1943, 104-5-11, whi(·h providPs that the 
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persons who n1ay he served with sumn1ons are "the presi-
dent or head of the Corporation, secretary, treasurer, 
cashier or managing agent, and if neither of the fore-
going can be found, then service 1nay be had upon a 
director found within the state." 
It was suggested at the time counsel for the plain-
tiff urged the vie'v herein expressed that the plaintiff 
might proceed against the defendant corporation by 
levying an attachment upon the property of the· defend-
ant and thus bring such property within the jurisdiction 
of the court and then establish his claim and have the 
same satisfied out of the property attached. There are 
two reasons why such a procedure could have no bear-
ing upon the statute of limitations. They being 
First: The basis for receiving an attaclunent during 
the time here involved are provided for in U.C .. A., 1943, 
104-18-1. The only provisions of such statute that even 
tend to give the color of a right to an attachment under 
the facts disclosed in this record, namely "That the de-
fendant conceals himself so that process cannot be served 
upon him" are not present. The facts in this case do not 
show or tend to show that the defendant or any of its 
officers concealed themselves from service of process. 
The fact that all of the officers or agents upon whom 
service may be had, other than the plaintiff, are absent 
from the state is not a concealing from the service of 
process any n1ore than would the absence of a personal 
defendant who is absent from the state be a concealing 
of such person fro1n the service of process. So also the 
fact that there is no person within the state of Utah upon 
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whom service of S·ummons 1nay be had upon the defend-
ant makes the defendant none the less in law a resident 
of the state notwithstanding that there is no officer upon 
whom service of summons may be had. In this con-
nection it should be kept in 1nind that even though a 
person maintains a residence in the state and a usual 
place of abode in which members of his family reside and 
upon whon1 service of swnmons may be had, under our 
statute the time such a person may be absent from the 
state must he deducted from the period fixed by the 
statute of limitations as to the outlawing of such a claim. 
Our statutes so provide and our courts have repeatedly 
so held. 
U. C.A., 1943, 104-'2-36 provides : 
''If when a cause of action accrues against a 
person he is out of the state, the action 1nay be 
commenced within the term herein limited after 
his return to the state; and if after a cause of ac-
tion accrues he departs from the state, the ti1ne 
of his absence is not part of the time lin1ited for 
the commencen1ent of the action." 
The foregoing section has been construed in the fol-
lowing cases: Burnes v .Crane, 1 U. 179; Lawson v. 
Tripp, 34 U. 28, 95 P. 520; Keith O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 
51 U. 227, 169 P. 954; Tracey v. Blood, 78 U. 385, 390, 
3 P. (2d) 263; Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., G4 U. 
391, 231 P. 123. 
We have a number of statutes which have, \Ve helieve, 
a bearing on the question here presented. A1nong then1 
being: U.C.A., 1943, 88-2-12 ·w·hich provide~: 
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•'In the construction of these statutes the fol-
lowing rules shall be observed, unless such con-
struction would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the legislature or repugnant to the con-
text of the statute : 
'' ( 5) The word "person" includes bodies 
politic. and corporate, partnerships, associations 
and companies." 
U. C. A., 1943, 88-2-12 provides that: 
''The rule of the common law that statut~s in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of this state. The 
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their provi-
sions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the ob .. 
jects of the statutes and to promote justice. When-
ever there is any variance between the rules of 
equity and the rules of common law in reference 
to the same matter the rules of equity shall pre-
ail " v . 
If effect is given to U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-36 and to 
U.C.A., 1943, 88-2-12, subdivision 5 there would seem to 
be no logical escape from the conclusion that the sta:tute 
of limitations did not run during the time that there was 
no officer or agent of the defendant corporation within 
the state of Utah that could he served with summons. 
T'he purpose and the sole purpose of the provision tolling 
the statute of limitations during the time a person is 
absent from the state would. seem to be that a plaintiff 
should have the full period fixed by the statute not only 
to bring his action but to be able to secure a p·eTsonal 
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service upon the defendant. The purpose of the law ap-
plies equally to an artifical person as to a natural person. 
Much might be said that if the statute of limitations does 
not run against a natural person during his absence fron1 
the state to say that it does run in favor of a corpora-
tion whose officers and agents 'vho might be served are 
all absent from the state would offend against the pro-
visions of Article VI Sec. 16 and 18 wherein it is provided 
that the legislature is prohibited from enacting any law 
"granting to an individual, association or corporation 
any privilege, immunity or franchise" and that in all 
cases where a general law can be applicable, no special 
law shall be enacted. It is, of course, elementary that if a 
law is subject to two constructions, one rendering the 
law valid and the other rendering it invalid, the former 
will be adopted. 
Among the cardinal rules applicable to the construc-
tion of the statutes are the following: 
"In the interpretation of statutes, the legi~­
lative will is the all important or controlling far-
tor. Indeed, it is frequently stated in effect that 
the intention of the legislature constitutes the 
law. The legislative intent has been designated 
the vital part, heart, soul, and essence of the la"., 
and the guiding star in the interpretation there-
of. Accordingly, the pri1nary rule of conHtruction 
of statutes is to ascertain and deelare the inten-
tion of the legislature, and earry such intention 
into effect to the fullest degree. A construction 
adopted should not bP such u~ to nullify, dt~stro~·, 
or defeat the intention of the legiHla ture. ,. 
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~·In the interpretation of a statute, the inten-
tion of the legislature is gathered from the pro-
visions enacted by the application of sound and 
well settled canons of construction. However, 
every technical rule as to the construction of a 
statute is subservient and must yield to the ex-
pression of the paramount will of the legislature, 
since all rules for the interpretation of statutes 
of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the 
discovery of the legislative intent, and are valu-
able only in so far as, in their application, they 
enable the courts the better to ascertain that in-
tent. It has even been declared that the intention 
of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail, 
any rule of construction declared by previous acts 
to the contrary notwithstanding." 50 Am. Jur., 
page 203-204, Sec. 224. 
"It is a general rule that the courts, in the 
interpretation of a statute, may not take, strike, 
or read anything out of a statute, or delete, sub-
tract, or omit anything therefrom. To the con-
trary, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion that significance and effect should, if possible, 
be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence, and 
part of an act." 50 Am. J ur., page 219, Sec. 2'31 
and cases cited. 
To the same effect see 50 Am. Jur., page 361, Sec. 
358 and cases cited in foot notes. 
A corporation is, of course, an entity created by 
law. It has no existence independent of its stockholders 
and officers. It can do business only through its office.rs. 
A personal judgment rnay be secured against it by and 
only by service of su1n1nons upon its officers. When its 
officers upon whom service of sumrnons may be had 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are absent from the state and therefore personal juris-
diction of the corporation cannot be obtained for all 
practical purposes, the corporation is absent from the 
state. To hold otherwise is to ignore the very basis pro-
vided by the legislature for tolling the statute of in1ita-
tions during the .absence of the defendant fro1n the state. 
Other cases which show or tend to sho'v that the 
statute of limitations was tolled during the tiine there 
was no officer in Utah upon whon1 service of sununons 
could he had are: Sherman v. Buffalo Bayou, B & 0 R. 
Co., 21 Tex. 349; which holds that where a corporation 
maintains an office where service of summons n1ay be 
had, it cannot be said the corporation is beyond the state. 
By inference if service cannot be had the statute is tolled. 
In the case of Closeport Coal, et.c., Co. v. Kingsbury, 10 
Ky 118, it is held that where a corporation is dissolved 
and officers, agents and managers have left the state so 
that no one remains on whom process can be served the 
statute of limitation does not run in its favor. That case 
is cited as being the law in 37 C.J. 1000 Sec. 395 'vhere 
other cases to the same effect are cited, Casey v. Anl,eri-
can Bridge Co., 116 Minn. 561; 134 N.W. 111, 38 I~.R.A. 
N S 521; Atchinson etc. R .. Co. v. Mills, 53 Tex. Civ. A. 
359; 116 S.W. 852. The cases generally are to the effect 
that if personal service may not be had on a eorporation 
whether foreign or domestic, the statute of lirnitation 
is tolled during the tin1e that service cannot be had. 
Another reason why the statute of liinitation~ is not 
available as a defense to plaintiff's aetion is that thPre 
'vas an acknowledgen1ent of the clai1n sued upon. 
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U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-45 provides that: 
Hln any case founded on contract, when a part 
of the principal or interest shall have been paid, 
or an ackno\vledgment of an existing liability, debt 
or claiJ:n, or any promise to pay the same, shall 
have been made, a:n action may be brought within 
the period prescribed for the same after such pay-
Inent, acknowledgrnent or p-romise; - - etc." 
There are a number of cases cited in the foot note to 
the statute just quoted from this and other jurisdictions. 
The cases from our own court as well as the courts gen-
erally make a distinction between an acknowledgment 
or pronrise to pay after the statute has run and the cases 
where the statute has not run and there is a mere· ac-
knowledgment. This case falls within the latter. When 
the statute has run the action by some of the authorities 
must be brought on the new promise and so in those cases 
a mere acknowledgment will not suffice·. We need not 
consider such cases because the statute of limitations 
had not run when on March 29, 1948 the defendant, 
through Mr. Holden acknowledged that the defendant 
was obligated to p·ay the plaintiff for his services. The 
fact that defendant claimed the $1000.00 check was suffi-
cient to pay the obligation does not nullify the acknowl-
edgment. On the contrary, the effect of the· letter accom-
panying the check was a clear acknowledgment of an 
obligation to pay whatever was owing. The most that can 
be said for the letter is that if the same was cashed, the 
defendant would consider the plaintiff p~id for his serv-
ices up to that date. To say that such language deprives 
the letter of any acknowledgment of the debt is to ignore 
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the clear meaning of the language used. If plaintiff were 
here seeking to recover on the letter which accompanied 
the check, an entirely different situation would be pre-
sented, and if such were the case we entertain no doubt 
that defendant can produce cases and other authorities 
that under such a state of facts which hold the action 
could not be maintained for anything in excess of the 
$1000.00. Such is, as we read then1, the holding of such 
cases as O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160 Pac. 
1192 and Weir v. Bauer, 7'5 Utah 498, 522, Pac. 936. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS TO ANSWER ITEM b OF GROUP 3 IN 
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT 
THERE WAS A RUNNING ACCOUNT AND EACH ITEIVI 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY (R. 20 
and Tr. 493). 
Plaintiff's claim falls under the provisions of U.C.A., 
1943, 104-2-23 now U.C.A., 1953, 78-12-25, where it is 
provided: 
"An action upon a contract, obligation, or lia-
bility not founded upon an instrument in \vriting ~ 
also on an open account for goods, wares and Iuer-
chandise, and for any articles charged in a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor 
or services rendered or 1naterial~ furnished; pro-
vided, that action in all of the foregoing- ('H;-o:P~ 
may be c.ouunenced at any tin1e within four yPa rs 
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The following cases fron1 this jurisdiction have con.;. 
strued the foregoing statute, son1e of which are before 
it was amended in 1935. O'Donnell v. Pa.rker, 48 Utah 
578, 160 P. 1192; Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239, 158 P. 788; 
Gulbra,nson v. Thonzpson, 63 Utah 115, 22·2 P. 590, where 
it is said that \Yhere services were rendered to a decedent 
covering a period of a number of years with temporary 
intermissions of a few months, it was held that the, serv-
ices being deemed continuous the bar of the statutes did 
not attach and the clai1n that the cause was barred was 
without merit. The meaning of an open account is dis-
cussed at some length and numerous cases will be found 
collected in foot notes to the text in 1 Am. Jur. 265, et 
seq. It will be noted contrary to defendant's contention 
that an account is none the le·ss such although not in 
writing. Thus it is said that "The term 'open account' 
means ordinarily an account based upon running or cur-
rent dealings between the parties which has not be~en 
closed, settled or stated and in such the inclusion of fur-
ther dealings between the parties is contemplated." 
Numerous cases are there cited under note 14. 
\ 
In this case there is no substantial conflict in th'e 
evidence as to the relations of the plaintiff and defendant. 
Such relation being that the plaintiff was the attornery 
for the defendant and as such was from time to time 
requested to do such legal and other services as 'vere re-
quested to be perforrned by Mr. Holden. H1e also fur-
nished the defendant an office in which to transact such 
business as it may have in the State of Utah. 
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As to the matter of the use of the office of the plain-
tiff by the defendant, it seems to be the position of the 
defendant that such fact did not enter into this case. If 
such a claim is made it cannot, in the light of 15b and 
49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, be successfully main-
tained. Rule 15b, page. 24 provides : 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such anrendments 
of the pleadings as 1nay be necessary to cause 
then1 to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time even after judg1nent, etc." 
Rule 49 in part provides that: 
"If in so doing (submitting case to jury for 
spe-cial verdict) the court o1ni ts any issue of fact 
raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each 
party waives his right to a trial by jury of the 
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires 
he demands its submission to the jury." 
We direct these matters to the attention of the court 
primarily for the purpose of showing the futility of at-
tempting to ge;t a finding of a jury on the question of 
whether or not the acconnt here involved was or was not 
such as that provided for by U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-23. 1\iore-
over an account may w·ell be such that a part thereof be-
cotnes fixed and when so fixed and deter1nined the stat-
utes of li1nitations runs after it is so fixed and in part 
such an account as that conte1nplated hy lT.C.A., 194:~, 
104-2-23. In this case the proC'eeding to ran<·el out the 
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holders of the Golden West in so far as it related to 
1noney paid to plaintiff to pay those who assisted in that 
proceeding may well bH, and indeed doubtless was, an in-
dependent and unrelated transaction, but from that fact 
it by no means follows that plaintiff's account with the 
defendant was not such an account as that contemplated 
by U.C.A. 1943, 104-2-23. Indeed it is almost inconce,iv-
able that in light of the continuous exchange of corre1s-
pondence touching the business of t~e corporation and 
the fact that the office of the company was that of the 
plaintiff who furnished his own stationery and secretary 
in the transaction of the defendant's business as well as 
his own; that the plaintiff's employment can be regarde:d 
as anything other than such as that contemplated by 
U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-23. For the plaintiff to have made 
charges for each item of work he did, es.pHcially e·ach 
letter he ·wrote for the defendant, would in many in-
stances have required as much time as it did to write the 
letter or do other small jobs. Without p-ursuing this 
phase of the ca.s'e further, it is plaintiff's position that 
most of the work that was done by plaintiff falls clearly 
within both the letter and spirit of U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-2'3, 
and it was the: province of the court to so conclude as a 
1natter of law. 
Th'e following quotation from 58 Am. Jur. 556, S-ec. 
56 contains what we believe to be~ a full and concise sta:te-
ment of the law touching the statute of limitation as to 
labor performed: 
"Where a clai1n for work, labor, or se,rvices 
perfor1ned is based upon distinct contracts for the 
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items sp'ecified, it would seen1 that the statute 
of limitations would com1nence to run as to those 
items represented by each contract. But where the 
matters specified in the claim are the outgrowth 
of an entire contract for continuous labor or serv-
ices, the den1and will he considered as an entire 
one and the statute will not attach until the conl-
pletion of the contract. Where services are ren-
dered under a contract of en1ployment which does 
not fix th·e term of service or the time for pay-
ment, the contract is continuous and the statute 
of limitations does not con1mence to run until the 
employee's services are terminated. Where, how-
ever, the hiring of services is without agreen1ent 
as to terms or amount of compensation, and there 
is no evidence of payments, the law, it seen1s, will 
not imply an agreement that payment of coin-
pensation shall be postponed until the tern1ination 
of the employment; in such cases the court 1nay, 
as bearing upon the· time the statute con11nences to 
run consider a prevalent custom or usage· approp-
riate to the kind of service as to the ti1ne 'vhen 
payments are us.ually n1ade. But it has been held 
that regular payments for a period of ti1ne of a 
part of the 1nonthly wages earned by a servant, 
who has been working for his employer for several 
years without a settleme:nt, will1nake the account 
mutual for the purpose of determining whether 
any part is barred by the statute of li1nitations. 
"When compensation for services is not to be 
rnade until a certain date, or the happening of a 
certain event, the statute of lilnitations doeR not 
begin to run until the time so fixed, and, aeeord-
ingly, full co1npensa.tion n1ay be· recovered at la"· 
for all services perfor1ned prior to that datP. 
B'rhe settled rule that the ~tatute of liruita-
tion::-; begins to rw1 upon the aecrual of a cause of 
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action applies in actions on implied and quasi con-
tracts. 
The statute does not conunenee: to run against 
the right to recover the reasonable value of per-
sonal services rendered under an unenforceable 
agreement for compensation upon their termina-
tion, until such termination." 
POIN·T FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUESTING THE 
JURY TO ANSWER QUESTION 2 OF GROUP 5 IN THAT 
IF MR. HOLDEN WAS PAID WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS 
OWING TO HIM THERE WOULD BE NO MONEY TO PAY 
PLAINTIFF (Tr. 493 and R. 21). 
The evidence shows that in 1941 upon motion of Mr. 
Holden he was allowed a salary of $500.00 per month and 
he was reimbursed $1700.00 for expenses (Tr. 98). In 
1944 the salary of Mr. Holden was again fixed at $500.00 
per month (Tr. 120) notwithstanding the mine had been 
closed down for a substantial period of time. Mr. Holden 
was paying him8elf $50.00 per month up to and at the! 
time of the trial for trying to get someone interested in 
the mine (Tr. 386). At the time of the trial the company 
had in cash $13,939.'52. It is thus obvious that if Mr. 
Holden had b~n paid his $500.00 a month· from the time 
that he secured the passage of the resolution there would 
have been no money with which to pay the plaintiff for 
his services. It is not made to appear by what authority 
Mr. Holden was paying to himself $50.00 per month for 
trying to get someone interested in the mine. It is quite 
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own personal property and took from its funds 'vhatever 
suited his purposes. Mr. Holden had been paid bet~ .. een 
$25,000.00 and $26,000.00 for services which in the n1ain 
were performed by the plaintiff herein (Tr. 426-427). 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL (R. 45 and 48). 
Within the time allo~ed by law the plaintiff filed 
a Motion for a New Trial upon various grounds, three of 
which we~re "Inadequate damages or con1pensation ap-
pearing to have been given under the influence of passion 
and prejudice" and "Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict and that it is against law" and "Errors 
in law." 
Plaintiff has heretofore discussed what he claims 
were errors of law in the matter of the court's instruc-
tions to the jury. Those are the errors in law that plain-
tiff claims are among the reasons why a new trial should 
have been granted. The other two grounds, above Inen-
tioned, which plaintiff claims entitled hin1 to a new trial 
are so inter-related that we shall discuss then1 together. 
We have heretofore directed the attention of the 
court to the fa0t that the plaintiff served the defendant 
as its attorney and in the eapacity of keeping its general 
manager who lived in California advised in all 1natters 
connected with the operation of thP defendant IuinP. 
lie also furnished the defendant eo1npany \vith an oft'it·f~ 
and provided a stenographer, stationery, a telephone 
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and sta.n1ps to carry on its business. Plaintiff also pro-
vided himself with the Ineans of conveyance~ and paid the 
expenses of his numerous trips to and from the mine in 
American F·ork Canyon, about sixty miles from Salt Lake 
and to and from Provo, Alnerican Fork and Lehi in Utah 
County on the business of the defendant company. He 
has received from tl1e defendanjt company a total of about 
$2500.00 not more than $350.00 of which was for his own 
use, the remainder was paid to other lawyers (Tr. 163). 
It may be here observed that Mr. Holden had control of 
all the disbursements of the money belonging to the de-
fendant company and he does not dispute the testimony 
of the plaintiff in such particular. Mr. Holden did tetstify 
of having paid for drawing up the Article~s of Incorpora-
tion and By-laws which were items for which plaintiff 
was not making a claim in this action. It does appear 
that Mr. B·eck was given 10,000 shares of the stock in de-
fendant company so that he could s:erve as a dir~ctor an·d 
an additional 20,000 shares came into his possession for 
some reason not known to the plaintiff. ·This stock, how-
ever, was of little if any value (Tr. 227). 
Thus the $350.00 which was paid to the· plaintiff 
throughout the years and tlre $1500.00 allowed by the 
jury makes a total of $1850.00 for more than thirty years 
of service as an attorney and in effect t'he local manager 
of the def·endant company with ,an office., the sHrvices of a 
stenographer when needed, stationery, the use of a tele-
phone and the furnishing of trans.portation thrown in for 
good n1easure. For thes-e se:rvices and expenses, if tlre 
verdict of the jury is permitte~d to stand, plaintiff will 
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receive only slightly in excess of one dollar per week, 
and is required to wait an average of fifteen years before 
he is to be paid. Thus if interest on the money which he 
did not receive was earned is to be taken into conside·ra-
tion, he will receive less than 50c per week and if con-
sideration be given to the fact that money is now worth 
only about one-half what it was worth when the plaintiff 
performed the service, the con1pensation would be at the 
rate of 25c per week. MoreOiver, it is a matter of conm1on 
knowledge that if paym·ent is dependent on a contingency 
a reasonabl'e compensation should be at least twice as 
much as if payment were certain. Thus, the plaintiff 
will in effect receive, under the award of the jury, not to 
exceed lOc or 12c per week for his labor and expenses in 
representing the def·endant ,company since 1921 up to 
tire commencement of this action in 1951. Such an an1ount 
will probably not p·ay the amount that plaintiff expended 
for the benefit of def·endant. 
It would extend this brief far beyond reasonable 
limits to itemize and co nun en t on the various i te1ns of 
services, including the: correspondence rendered for and 
on behalf of the defendant company. An exan1ination 
of the numerous letters written ~and received by the plain-
tiff are indicative of the tin1e plaintiff devoted to the 
business of the defendant in addition to the legal and 
other work he did as te~stified to by hi1n. Nor wru-; all 
of the legal services rendered by the plaintiff the ordi-
nary and usual work that cornes to an attorney'~ office. 
The services plaintiff rendered in such Ina tter~ us ~P­
euring loans fron1 the lT nited States 0-oyernJnPnt \\'Pre in 
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a special and unusual field. When gas develop,ed in the 
mine which was being operated by less.ees, a somewhat 
unusual problem was prese·nted to determine whether or 
not the defendant company was liable in damage:s for the 
injury and death of son1e of the miners. Both B·enjamin 
L. Rich and Herbert Van Dam ~re attorneys of long 
experience in attending to such n1atters as those which 
the plaintiff performed for defendant company. After 
hearing the evidence of Mr. Beck they each placed the 
value of such services at at least $12,000.00. While we 
are mindful that a jury or other finder of the fact is not 
bound by opinion evidence, yet it is equally well serttled 
1aw that the fact finding tribunal may not totally ignore 
such testimony. That in this case the jury ignorHd such 
testimony is made obvious in that they found the· s:ervicers 
of the plaintiff worth only 1/8 of that fixed by Me1ssers 
Rich and Van Dam. 
The trial court was in accord, in part at l~eas:t, with 
the opinion of Messers Rich and Van Dam in that while 
he denied a new trial, he stated into the record that: 
"This Memorandwn is written at the request 
of counsel for the plaintiff because the request 
made by the Court referred to herelin had not been 
preserved . 
. "After denying the plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial, I became conS'cious of a confli0t in the 
decisions of the Utah Supreme C:ourt, to~wit: 
Pauly v. Wilson McCarthy, Utah Supreme 
Court No. 6846; 
Duffy v. Union Pacific, Utah Supreme Court 
No. 7294; and 
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Wheat v. Denver & Rio Grande, Utah Su-
preme Court No. 7838. 
and requested fue, Court Clerk to call the attor-
neys, on both sides, and have them check these de-
cisions, and re-argue the 1notion for a ne\v trial if 
they desired. 
"My reason for the request was that I was 
of the opinion that the verdict was inadequate, but 
on the Motion for N~·w Trial no evidence was pre-
sented of passion or prejudice, except as n1ight 
be inferred from the small an1ount of the verdict. 
"Without eyidence of passion, I felt that under 
Rule 59 (a) (5) on excessive or inadequate dam-
ages, a new trial could not be granted. Under 
that rule we 'have been granting new trials, con-
ditional upon the failure of the plaintiff to reduce 
the a1nount of the verdict, where passion existed, 
and then in the Wheat case, such a reduction was 
allowed within the existence· of pas~sion. 
"The Court was of the opinion that perhapf-' if 
the ve·rdict could be reduced a new trial could also 
be granted on the s1ame basis. This option, ho\Y-
ever, was developed subsequent to the denjal of a 
mOition for a new trial in this eas·e, and I de·sired 
a re~a.rgument upon that basis. 
"'The Court was late.r inforn1ed by counsel for 
the plaintiff that i~t was perhaps too late to argue 
a r·econsideration of the 1notion for a ne'Y trial. 
"Dated this 3rd day of June, 1953. 
(S) JosEPH G. JEPPSON 
District Judge." 
If we had been able to convince ourselves that the 
trial court ha.d jurisdiction to reconsider plaintiff's ulo-
tion for a ne"· trial, we rertainl~r \Vould haYe urged such 
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action. However, the motion for a ne:w trial had be1en 
denied for more than 10 days before we had an in.dioation 
that the court below was disp9sed to further conside·r ~the 
motion for a new trial. We can find nothing in thei rules 
that permit sueh procedure, particularly after the, time 
for making such a motion has expired. We we.re then 
fearful and we still entertain the view that if a mortion 
had been made for a reconsideration of the mortion for a 
new trial, the later motion would he of no avail, and ·if 
a new trial should be granted and thereafter if it should 
be held that the motion for recon'sideration was a nullity, 
our time f.or appeal from the: judgment would doubtless 
have expired and we would be without any right to have 
the judgment reviewed by 'this court. On the other hand, 
if the Court should refuse to reconsider the motion for a 
new trial or after hearing the same should deny a new 
trial, the results would, we· feared, be the same, n·amely, 
th!at the time for appeal would have. expired before 'an ap-
peal could have been taken. If we had been able to find 
any authority to suppo~t a motion before1 the lower court 
to reconsider our motion for a new trial, we certainly 
would have pursued that cause before going to t!he ex-
pense and labor of app:ealing this case to this court. 
In the cas:e of Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383; 113 Pac. 
1023, it is held ·tha:t the distriet court is without p-ower 
to entertain 'a motion for a rehearing of an order deny-
ing a new trial ·and that the time for appe~al begins to run 
fvom the time of the origin~al order denying a ne:w trial. 
To the same effect is Lund v. Third District Court, 90 
Utah 433; 62 P.a.c. (2d) 278. It will be noted that the 
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trial judge in his memorandmn heretofore quoted as to 
why he deni:ed the motion to grant a new trial, refe·rs to 
Rule 59 (a) (5) und three Utah 0ases. We have read and 
re-read ~the Utah cases referred to but are unable to find 
anything said or decided in those eases which preclude 
the gr~arrting ·of a new trial, but on the contrary, the doc-
trine announced in those and other cases in this jurisdic-
tion require·s the granting of a new trial. We are not 
entirely clear if the trial judge entertained the view that 
before a new trial could be granted there must be some 
evidence independent of the size of the verdict to support 
a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 (a) (5) and the 
cases refe·rred to in his me1norandurn. If such were the 
view of th·e trial judge he was, we believe, clearly in 
error. It is to say the least that it would be extremely 
difficult if not impossible to show that a verdict is excess-
ive or inadequate except by the amount of the verdiet 
when viewed in light of the evidence. Even if one juror 
were willing to sign an Affidavit that S10ine of his fellow 
jurors acted under the influence of passion, such an affi-
davit would doubtless be rejected. Black v. Rocky JJJ t'll. 
B·ell Tel. Co., 26 Utah 451, 73 Pac. 514; People v. Flynn, 
7 Utah 378; Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465; 267 Pac. 188. 
This court has frequently had occasion to announce the 
rules that should guide the trial eourt in pa~~ing upon a 
n1otion for a new trial. An1ong such cases are: Clark 
v. Los Angeles and· S. L. R. Co., 73 {T. 48G, :275 Pae. 
582 where it is said that if the trial tourt is of the opin-
ion that ijhe jury in rendering its verdi<'t di~regarded 
the 1uanife~t weight of the evidPnce, or Ini~eoneeivPrl it, or 
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disobeyed the charge, or were influ,enced through pas:s±orn 
or prejudice, the court 'vould not only be authorized, but 
it would be its duty to grant a new trial. 
Other cases of similar import are: Duffy v. Union 
Pac. R. R. Co., 218 Pac. (2d) 1080; Meehan v. Foley, 235 
Pac. (2d) 497; Wheat v. Denver & R. G. Co., 250 Pac. 
(2d) 932; Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 
568, 207 Pac. (2d) 178. Numerous other casHs dealing 
with tJhe question of when and when nort a nerw trial may 
or should be granted have been decided by this court but 
no useful purpose will be served by adding to the cas·es 
ahove cited. 
In many of the cas'es it is said that the granting of a 
new trial is largely witJhin the discretion of the trial 
judge. While in tills case the trial court denie;d a new 
trial, it is made to appear from the memorandum here·to-
fore quoted that his failure to grant a new trial was ap-
parently caused by his having misconstrued some of t!he 
recent decisions of this court. 
Before concluding thi·s Brief it should be noted tha:t 
while a majority of the cases which have. been before this 
court are cases where the· claim is made that the verdicts 
are excessive, the principles of law effecting tilie granting 
of a new trial are the same· whether the amoun-t of the 
verdict brought in que~stion is e·xces~sive or inadequate. 
The;re is, hOiwever, probably this difference·; if a verdict 
is deemed excessive, the courts may require a reduction 
of the verdict, or upon !a failure of a consent to such 
reduction a new trial will be granted. That is. p~roibably 
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not so where a verdict is inadequate because as son1e of 
the courts have said that if tlre court exacts an increase 
in the verdict as a condition. for not granting a new trial, 
such action of the court is in effect the court exercising 
the functions of the jury, because the jury has never 
found a verdict for the excess while in case where tl1e 
amount of the verdict is to be decreased to avo1id the 
granting of -a new trial, the jury has found the runount 
of the reduced verdict and something in addition thereto. 
We submit that the judg1nent appealed fron1 should 
be reversed and a new trial ordered and appellant a'vard-
ed his costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REED N. NIE·LSON 
ELIAS HANSEN 
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